. A FEW CAVEATS A point of terminology should be clarified from the start. Throughout this manual, the term “trade ministry” is used to me...
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A FEW CAVEATS A point of terminology should be clarified from the start. Throughout this manual, the term “trade ministry” is used to mean whatever government agency is given the principal responsibility for the making of trade policy, and especially the conduct of trade negotiations. This does not necessarily mean that the I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 7 term “trade” appears in the title of that ministry, nor indeed that the agency is deemed to be a ministry; it might alternatively be designated as a department, bureau, or other entity within a larger ministry, or be operated as some other type of independent or interministerial body. The same institution that takes the lead in trade negotiations may also be responsible for other trade-related functions, such as the promotion of exports and investment; alternatively, some or all of these tasks may be assigned to other government bodies, to public–private partnerships, or be outsourced altogether to the private sector. For the sake of simplicity, however, all of these various arrangements are subsumed here under the rubric of “the trade ministry”. The analysis makes no effort to urge the adoption of any specific philosophy or doctrine regarding trade policy and its place in a country’s development strategy, nor does it identify a single, best approach that countries might take to the ministerial division of labour.
The underlying assumption throughout is that no matter what objectives a country may seek in its trade policy, and no matter what organizational arrangements or negotiating tactics it may adopt, its chances of success will be greater if it has in place procedures for systematically monitoring and analysing economic and political data, efficiently managing the flow of internal and external communications, dealing effectively with all partners and stakeholders, and devising policy within a well-reasoned framework.
All countries face the questions that are posed here, but each of them are responsible for finding the answers that best suit their own circumstances. It is also important to stress that this is not a strategy manual, providing countries with guidance on how best to achieve their objectives in a given negotiation. There already exists abundant literature on his subject, filled with the requisite quotations from Sun Tzu and employing the sometimes arcane jargon of aspiration points, zones of possible agreement, and BATNAs (best alternatives to a negotiated agreement).
The contributions to that literature instruct readers on how best to create and claim value, how to choose between integrative and distributive strategies, how to play a two-level game, how to know the difference between a true threat and a mere bluff, and how a good negotiator tries not just to persuade one’s counterpart but even to shape his or her perceptions. While recognizing the value of this literature, and urging that readers familiarize themselves with the theory and practice of negotiations, the present manual does not itself constitute such a guide. It instead offers pointers on how countries might go about devising one that is custom built to their own needs. Readers will note that at many points in this analysis, data are provided on how developing countries compare on certain issues. Those comparisons generally exclude developing or transitional countries in either Europe or the Middle East (except North Africa), and also exclude major oil exporters.2 Those exclusions are based on the very different circumstances that both sets of countries find themselves in vis à vis developing countries as a whole. Including data on those countries, or on the economies in transition, could severely skew those comparisons that seek to identify the relationship (if any) between a given factor and average income per capita. Note also that World Bank data are used whenever possible, and most often for 2015. If 2015 data are not available for a given country, then the 2014 figures are used; except where otherwise noted, countries for which 2014 data are not available are excluded from any table.
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