Conclusions and Recommendations aakashvili is pursuing a high-risk strategy: by making the restoration of the country’s territorial integri...
Conclusions and Recommendations aakashvili is pursuing a high-risk strategy: by making the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity his first priority and seeking to resolve long-running separatist disputes, he risks undermining his own political position if he fails to achieve this. He declared his determination to tackle the issue of separatism right at the beginning of his presidency, perhaps in an attempt to demonstrate his leadership credentials and intention of following a more dynamic path than his predecessor. The Georgian leader needs to focus on “soft” means of persuasion and conflict resolution,
taking a “carrot” rather than a “stick” approach by seeking to meet peoples’ basic needs with the provision of pensions, medicines and fertilizers, rather than immediately resorting to “hard” military pressure in order to reinforce its political message to the separatist regions. By providing proactive economic rehabilitation and social assistance programs, Tbilisi can seek to quell separatism through economic and political persuasion, offering them commodities and facilities that the regional authorities are unable to, as well as substantial autonomy, in the hope of convincing the populations that they will be better off within Georgia rather than outside of it. Although he has consistently denied that Tbilisi is planning a military campaign against either Abkhazia or South Ossetia, he may be left with little choice if attempts to resolve the disputes by political and economic means fails.
While a renewed offensive appears an unlikely prospect, if Saakashvili were to decide that the military is in a position to resolve the political stalemate by force, the ensuing conflicts could spell disaster for the volatile South Caucasus and may necessitate the deployment of international peacekeepers or peacemakers, together with a substantial humanitarian aid package and forces to protect energy infrastructure in the region. Resolving the situation by military means also raises the possibility of further confrontation with Russia, although Tbilisi has called on Russia to remain neutral and not get involved in separatist conflicts on Georgian territory. As discussed above, the resolution of both the South Ossetian and Abkhazian disputes depends on the attitude that Russia takes and its role as a mediator must be fostered, although not at the expense of Georgia’s position. Moscow has a very positive role to play as the major economic and military power in the South Caucasus, but it needs to move away from its traditional geopolitical view of the region towards a more co-operative and consensual approach. Peaceful settlement of the two conflicts would boost stability in the Caucasus and strengthen regional security. Western states must make a commitment to stability and democracy in the region, and efforts to sort out unresolved conflicts in the region need to be stepped up by international S 17 and regional actors. Although the OSCE and UN have to date remained the key external actors involved in attempts to resolve Georgia’s long-running separatist problems, their efforts are hampered by a lack of consensus among its members and effective enforcement mechanisms. The EU has more leverage: it is developing into a major international player and is a key trading partner for the South Caucasus countries, giving it considerable influence.
Thus the EU, as well as individual member-states, need to redouble their involvement in the search for acceptable solutions. There is some optimism for positive action in 2006, as the Austrian and Finnish presidencies have made it clear that they intend to consider expanding the role of the EUSR, as well as supporting EU conflict resolution efforts.28 If the EU really is committed to boosting stability in the South Caucasus then it needs to take substantive action, rather than merely making well-meaning statements and publishing reports. It needs to expand the mandate of the EUSR and take concrete steps towards enhancing the conflict prevention aspect of its presence in the region. Increasing its border monitoring role would enable the EU to view the situation at first-hand, rather than relying on information from third-parties. It should promote the negotiation process and advocate the necessity of compromise and consensus. In both disputes, confidence must be restored and all sides need to express a willingness to compromise on key issues such as political autonomy and the rights of refugees.
Furthermore, Russia must be encouraged to play a more positive role and end years of persistent interference. This is perhaps the most difficult task: the EU lacks any form of leverage by which it can seek to influence Russian behavior—it cannot offer the potential of membership, as the prospects of Russia ever joining (or ever wanting to join) the EU are minimal—while conversely, Russia appears to have considerable leverage in the form of its hydrocarbons. Mikheil Saakashvili faces an uphill struggle to re-integrate the rebellious regions back into the Georgian fold. He needs to strike a balance between preserving Georgia’s territorial integrity and protecting the rights of the Abkhazian and Ossetian peoples. Although he is determined to engage the separatist regions in dialogue about their political status, the separatist leaders have no incentive to participate in negotiations whilst they have the security of Russian backing. In order to prevent further deterioration of either separatist dispute, Georgia must focus on political and economic efforts to resolve the conflicts, Russia must be persuaded that it is in its best interest to play a positive role and the EU must deepen its engagement with the region as a whole. Superficially, Georgia’s secessionist conflicts are a dispute between the authorities in Tbilisi and separatists. However, they have become a battleground between Georgia and Russia, with the former seeking to maintain its territorial integrity and sovereignty in the face of persistent interference by the latter
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