Hypothesis 2.a (financial life cycle): For start-ups, which are “the most informationally opaque” type of business, it is difficult to obt...
Hypothesis 2.a (financial life cycle): For start-ups, which are “the most informationally opaque” type of business, it is difficult to obtain external funding (Berger and Udell 1998). Information opacity prevents investors in small firms from distinguishing between high-quality and low-quality companies. Consequently, Berger and Udell (1998) argued that debt, due to the higher interest rate applied by lenders to hedge against the higher default probability, is costly for young firms. Due to asymmetric information, young, informationally opaque firms are less leveraged. This phenomenon can inhibit small firms from using external funding at all (Weinberg 1994)
, in addition to the fact that cash-flows are needed to service interest payments, and small and young business are typically not able to generate positive cash-flows in the early stages. Consequently, according to Fluck (2000), and to the empirical results of Carey et al. (1993) and Helwege and Liang (1996), young firms are financed mainly by insiders, business angels, and venture capital. Equity as a source of funds allows the soundness of an investment to be monitored, while “patient” capital can wait for long-term economic returns on investments and thereby meet the longer financial needs of a young firm. Especially given an imperfect market, the venture capitalist professionally supports a young firm with his or her financial resources and skills (Kaplan and Stromberg 2003). In regards, Carey et al. (1993) and Helwege and Liang (1996) showed that small entrepreneurial firms frequently issue outside equity before they issue debt. Bank debt is typically more readily available after a firm has achieved significant tangible assets that might be collateralized. The use of debt increases over time and becomes particularly important in the maturity stage of a business (Berger and Udell 1998)
. As a firm becomes larger and more mature, and less informationally opaque, its financing choices change, including better access to the debt market (Chittenden et al. 1996). Therefore, leverage increases with age, as young firms are financially constrained while old firms have convenient access to external finance. Therefore, this life-cycle pattern of firm financing assumed that small firms will use outside equity first (such as venture capital finance) and retained earnings, issuing debt at last to satisfy their subsequent financing needs. This approach contrasts with that described in the pecking-order model mainly with respect to the financing choices of start-up firms. Hypothesis 2.b
(reputational effect): Also a reputation argument supports the convenient use of debt only in the maturity stage. Young firms, without past experience and a track record, have a low debt capacity. Vice versa, firms that have consolidated their business, with past history, past profitability, track record, and credibility and reliability in the product market, are not constrained in the credit market and can obtain finance under good economic terms. These firms have typically developed a positive reputation to be spend the financial market (Diamond 1989). Therefore, early in the growth cycle, small businesses have little repayment history or record of profitability upon which external suppliers of funds can rely. For such firms, internal resources (by entrepreneur or his family) are fundamental,
and when these are exhausted, venture capital becomes the primary choice. After a period of sufficient profits as well as reliability and credibility in the market, firms gain a positive reputation and are thus able to readily obtaining the required financing, including debt (Hirshleifer and Thankor 1992). As the firm matures, outside stakeholders can examine the firm’s track record and its creditworthiness over time. A firm’s reputation attenuates the problem of asymmetric information and improves its access to external sources of funding, such as trade credit and bank debt (Diamond 1989). Thus, gaining a reputation in the market over time, reducing moral hazard problems, provides to older firms better conditions for using debt as source of finance. As stated by Diamond (1989) older firms will be able to increase their use of debt. Empirically, Fluck, Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1998)
find that the proportion of funds from insiders increases during the early stages of firm’s life cycle, while the proportion of outsider finance declines. However at some point this relationship reverses. They interpret this result as a consequence of the development of a positive reputation in credit markets which allow the firm to obtain cheaper sources of external financing. Hypothesis 3.a (reverse financial life cycle): Entrepreneurs’ financial resources and those of their families are, by definition,
limited; thus, for a young firm insider financial resources are usually not sufficient to allow start-up and growth. The role of debt funds in providing needed financial support beginning at the start-up phase and continuing thereafter can be explained by the entrepreneur’s aim to sustain growth and retain the control of the business (Hamilton and Fox 1998)8 . Berger and Udell (1998) observed that young firms may be heavily financed by external debt from financial institutions, because this funding is not entirely external9 . When loaning money to small businesses, most financial institutions require that the owners personally guarantee the loan.
These guarantees give the institution recourse to the personal wealth of the small-business owner in the event of default. Similarly, Petersen and Rajan (1994) found that young firms (less than 2 years old) rely most heavily on loans from the owner and his or her family and then on bank loans. Moreover, in their initial years of this business, the largest incremental source of funds is from banks, with the dependence on personal funds gradually decreasing. As the firm grows, a devoted entrepreneur will remain inclined to place self-generated financial resources into the firm.
These funds provide further capital and thus the fraction of borrowing from banks declines as the firm matures. Therefore, firms rebalance their capital structure at the maturity stage. Empirically, Robb (2002) reports, in contrast to Fluck, Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1998), that younger firms use relatively more debt than older firms. Moreover, according to Petersen and Rajan (1994), leverage decreases with the age of the firm, as young firms are externally financed while mature ones mainly use retained earnings and equity. These authors suggested that firms follow a “pecking order” of borrowing over time, starting with the closest sources, i.e., family capital and bank capital based on family pledges, and then progressing to more external sources.
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